


**University of Reading
International Model United
Nations Conference 2015**



**United Nations General
Assembly:
Disarmament and
International Security**

Topic A:

The Militarization of the Arctic:
Political, Economic and Climatic Challenges.

Topic B:

The Growing Relevance of UAVs in International Security, Armed
Conflicts and Peacekeeping Missions.

Study Guide

Rituja Rao and Mahdi Salehin

Co-Chair

Head Chair



Introducing Rituja Rao

Rituja Rao is your Head Chair for DISEC. First of all, she would like to welcome you to ReadIMUN and secondly, congratulate you as you are now a MUNner.

Rituja says that she can talk to anyone, anywhere, anytime and about anything. She is from India and is studying Journalism at the University of Westminster.

She has been to 7 conferences as a delegate and has had a track record of winning an award at each of them. She has also been Security Council Chair at WIMUN, India. She enjoys debating but is definitely not opposed to talking about something other than UN.

Rituja says you can talk to her about rainbows, unicorns, cats or food.

Her priority is a good debate at a conference, and aims to provide this at ReadIMUN, as well as make sure you have a good time. When you enter the committee her advice is to be the delegate you are; it is a life altering debate and your say matters. As her delegate, you only need two things – a will to speak and to speak. She promises you that this conference will make you confident and an MUN-addict like herself. If you are a beginner or an expert, it's not in the number of conferences you've attended, it's in what you have to say!



Introducing Salehin Mohammed Mahdi

Mahdi is going to be your DISEC Co-chair. He is glad to serve as your Chair at this year's ReadIMUN conference and will do everything possible to make it a unique experience for each of you.

Model United Nations is not only about simulating the most spectacular body in international politics, it is also about forging new friendships, enjoying yourselves during social events and learning about new topics and countries' positions. Therefore it will be his pleasure to guide you through the conference and to assist you with reaching conclusions during the debating process.

He started doing MUN when he joined University, and his first big international conference was in Reading last year. He enjoyed it a lot and hopes that you will enjoy it this year as well. After Reading he attended five more conferences, yet this will be his first time chairing in a conference.

Coming from Bangladesh, Mahdi can speak Bengali. Currently, he is doing his second year of a Civil Engineering degree and hopes to finish it as quickly as possible. He says he is a very lazy person and so in his leisure time just likes to sleep. He is only kidding; he does have hobbies of reading story books, Japanese manga and watching anime. As for sports he plays table tennis on a regular basis and plays football occasionally.

He is really looking forward to the conference in Reading and to the DISEC committee!

Topic A:

The Militarization of the Arctic: Political, Economic and Climatic Challenges

Overview

With the end of the Cold War and the softening of a geopolitical lensing of the region, a new political paradigm emerged in the Arctic, based upon institutional frameworks supporting and facilitating cooperation on mutual interests and challenges.

The Arctic is an augmenting strategic priority for the A-5 states: the United States of America, Russia, Canada, Denmark and Norway. Over the last decade, all of them have promulgated multi-dimensional strategies that explicitly state that their primary (although not only) interest is exercising sovereignty over their northern territories and achieving other national security interests, including a stable regional order. Furthermore, some, such as the United States and Russia, have created Arctic specific defence policies. It is evident from these documents that the military emphasis in the region will increase, although there is careful consideration to portray their presence and employment in non-confrontational terms. (1)

The Arctic is home to significant resources such as 30% of the world's undiscovered gas and 13% of the world's undiscovered oil, and can now serve as an important passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans with the advent of global warming and improved icebreaking technology.

The Arctic Region

The Arctic is the area surrounding the North Pole. The Arctic consists of the Arctic Ocean and parts of Canada, Russia, Greenland, the United States, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland. Geographically, the Arctic is defined as the area north of the Arctic Circle (66° 33'N). Due to the severe climate, the Arctic is largely uninhabited and all relatively major cities are at the southern edges of the Arctic Circle.

Arctic during the Cold War

As a consequence of U.S.-Soviet Cold War tensions, the 1950s saw an intimate defence cooperation between Canada and the United States. Facing potential nuclear attacks via the

Arctic, the United States pressed for the construction of radar stations across the Canadian Arctic. The resultant Distant Early Warning Line (DEW Line) was to monitor the Arctic airspace and deter and provide advance notice of potential attacks.

Despite similar Cold War outlooks, negotiations between Washington and Ottawa over the construction and the operation of the DEW Line increasingly produced resentments and concerns on the part of Canadians within the government as well as the public sphere. Canadian apprehensions about a substantial U.S. presence in the sparsely populated and undeveloped Canadian Arctic raised questions about Ottawa's ability to exercise sovereignty and protect Canadian jurisdiction in its northern territory.

Arctic during 1990s

In the early 20th century, the Arctic powers based their claims in the Arctic off the sector principle. The sector principle meant that each country could lay claim to the territory enclosed within lines drawn from the Arctic Circle to the Eastern and Western boundaries of the country. There were many conflicts concerning sovereignty over parts of the Arctic Sea during the 1920's. Both Canada and Russia laid claim to the territory north of their borders all the way to the North Pole. Arctic affairs gained a new, sinister flavour following World War II. As East-West tensions grew, the strategic and military aspects of the Arctic become crucial. The Arctic was extremely important during the Cold War because the shortest distance between the US and the Soviet Union was over the Arctic. As the United States did not have much territory in the Arctic it had to rely on treaties and agreements with other Arctic powers to protect this region.

Current Situation

Environmental Implications and Natural resources

For centuries, the Arctic region received little attention for the simple reason that it was too hostile an environment to merit any attention. But due to climate change and prospects of harnessing untapped oil, gas and mineral resources, it is now receiving wide attention and creating unexpected and complex new challenges. The Arctic's increase in temperature is setting the stage for 'cold war' to compete for who rules 'No Man's Sea' surrounding the North Pole. It may not get the fate of its polar opposite — Antarctica — which was demilitarised and dedicated to science because of its strategic insignificance.

The fragile Arctic is warming in the most unpredictable way. As the US takes over the chairmanship of the Arctic Council, countries surrounding this region are bracing for new challenges and rivalries. In September 2013, Greenpeace 'Arctic 30' activists were arrested and put on trial in Russia following a protest against Arctic offshore oil drilling by Gazprom. Their protest was part of a larger concern for the fate of the Arctic environment, in view of the gold rush to exploit its resources. But what has evoked renewed strategic interest in this region is Russian President Vladimir Putin's reported order for larger military presence in the Arctic in response to Canada's claims? The impact of climate change on Arctic is clearly visible in the form of declining sea ice, melting glaciers, thawing permafrost, and changing landscape. The Arctic ice levels are now at the lowest covering a much smaller area than 30 years ago and it is

predicted that, if melting continues at the current rate, the Arctic will be free of ice all year round by 2030.

According to US Geological Survey, the area north of the Arctic Circle has an estimated 90 billion barrels of undiscovered, technically recoverable oil, 1,670 trillion cubic feet of technically recoverable natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of technically recoverable natural gas *liquids* in 25 geologically defined areas. These resources account for about 22 per cent of the undiscovered, technically recoverable resources in the world. About 84 per cent of the estimated resources are expected to occur offshore. The melting ice has also opened new sea routes like North-West Passage (US and Canada) and the North-East Passage (Norway and Russia), promising a paradigm shift in the maritime transport. The maritime routes connecting Tokyo with New York will be 4000 km shorter by 2030, thereby opening more commercial opportunities. This has made coastal states to struggle to control new maritime routes even though some argue these straits are international. (3)

Militarisation of the Arctic

The actual extent of capabilities and operations of military forces in the Arctic, while growing, is still limited largely to within the A-5 state borders. Even the much-hyped Russian armada in September 2013 occurred during ideal weather conditions, and close to shore. Furthermore, many military exercises, such as Nanook and Cold Response, occur in the summer months, due to the difficulties of conducting them in the weather extremes, which characterise much of the year.

Procurement and financing issues in building and maintaining such capabilities are also a limitation for some Arctic states. Developing regional expertise and experiences with respect to equipping, training, and stationing forces is a major challenge, and they compete with other military and spending priorities.

Beyond capability gaps and challenges, militarisation implies that military developments have come to dominate the regional discourse, driven by changing and augmenting threat perceptions that the future security environment will become more hostile. Such analyses give a parsimonious, mono-casual picture of the forces behind these issues, which are, in reality, varied and interlinked. The growing military focus upon the region by some A-5 states has more to do with the geographic positioning of the country than with an increasingly pessimistic view with respect to future regional cooperation.

Further, the nature of some military exercises are not simply oriented towards developing combat capable forces, but in building and strengthening governmental capacities within these remote areas.

Finally, some military developments **defined by presence of military personnel or equipment** in the Arctic are based upon larger, extra-regional factors. Having the United States and Russia in the region, given their wider strategic relationship, blurs the lines between developments which are Arctic specific vice those of a more global nature. For example, the placement of interceptor missiles in Alaska by Washington is not designed to counter some Arctic threat, but that of North Korea's expanding nuclear missile arsenal. The rebuilding of Russia's Northern Fleet, particularly its nuclear ballistic submarine component, while conducting operations in the Arctic is designed to upgrade Moscow's largest fleet for global operations and to shore up its nuclear deterrent. Also, the use of multi-role combat naval ships in the region by the smaller A-5 states – Canada, Denmark and Norway – may not be driven by an augmented security posture as much as by necessity, due to the limited availability of platforms. These nations do not have the

luxury of regionally defined fleets, leading them to build and use multi-purpose vessels in a variety of global operational theatres.

Territorial Claims

Interest in asserting territorial claims over the Arctic Region is not a recent development. Early claims to the Arctic were motivated by a desire to find a shipping sea route between Europe and Asia. These efforts were cut off by the icy conditions of the Arctic, which made travel through parts of the Arctic Ocean impossible. Recently, however, the global climate is changing, causing the Arctic Region to become warmer. This, in turn, is causing the sea ice to melt and the season for navigation to lengthen. Though the melting sea ice could devastate Arctic biodiversity and indigenous cultures, it enables access to the Arctic Ocean, for which navigators and explorers have searched for centuries. Today, access to the Arctic is not only coveted for shipping sea routes, but also for its natural resources of oil, gas, and fish stocks. New access to these treasures has fuelled an international territorial fight over an area that was once largely ignored.

The committee must consider:

- 1) The Melting Sea Ice creating new access to Arctic.
- 2) The Coveted Resources of the Arctic: Navigation and Oil.

Territorial Disputes

Lomonosov Ridge

Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (via Greenland), and the Russian Federation each assert that the Ridge is an extension of their own continental shelf. Proof of its continuation would give the State access to the sea bed and natural resources beyond the current 200 nautical mile (nm) limit. The United States claims it to be an oceanic ridge and thus not an extension of any State's continental shelf, and therefore refutes any claim to its ownership. (4)

Hans Island

Canada and Denmark (via Greenland) continue to dispute the status of Hans Island.

Both states currently dispute the territorial status of a small - 1.3 square kilometres- island in the Kennedy Channel of the Nares Strait between Canada's Ellesmere Island and northern Greenland. The uninhabited island lies between the equidistant boundaries determined by a 1973 treaty between the two States. At the time, negotiators could not agree on the status of

the island and left its status out of treaty negotiations. As recently as April 11, 2012, both States acknowledged the idea of splitting the island, but an agreement has yet to be reached. (4)

The key players in the Arctic

There are eight countries with the geographic potential to make continental shelf claims to regions of the Arctic: Canada, Denmark (including its territory of Greenland and its province of the Faeroes Island), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America. The following discussion will address the current positions of the five leading Arctic powers: Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the U.S. The aforementioned warming of the Arctic climate has transformed this region into a territorial treasure trove, with each of these five nations claiming to be the finder. The resolution of these claims will not just shape the future of the Arctic territorially, but also environmentally and ecologically. (2)

For a detailed Timeline please refer to <http://www.stimson.org/infographics/evolution-of-arctic-territorial-claims-and-agreements-a-timeline-1903-present/>

A brief look at the Timeline:

ONGOING

Hans Island

Canada and Denmark (via Greenland) continue to dispute the status of Hans Island.

Both states currently dispute the territorial status of a small - 1.3 square kilometer - island in the Kennedy Channel of the Nares Strait between Canada's Ellesmere Island and northern Greenland. The uninhabited island lies between the equidistant boundaries determined by a 1973 treaty between the two States. At the time, negotiators could not agree on the status of the island and left its status out of treaty negotiations. As recently as April 11, 2012, both States acknowledged the idea of splitting the island, but an agreement has yet to be reached.

Lomonosov Ridge

Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (via Greenland), and the Russian Federation each assert that the Ridge is an extension of their own continental shelf. Proof of its continuation, would give the State access to the sea bed and natural resources beyond the current 200 nautical mile (nm) limit. The United States claims it to be an oceanic ridge and thus not an extension of any State's continental shelf, and therefore refutes any claim to its ownership.

2014

16 December

Denmark is expected to submit a claim to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) within the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

(UNCLOS), to attempt to prove that the Lomonosov Ridge is an extension of Greenland's land mass.

Within the 2011 "Kingdom of Denmark: Strategy for the Arctic 2011 - 2020," Denmark asserts that it will submit data and other material to the CLCS as a basis for extension of the continental shelf beyond 200nm on three areas near Greenland, including the Lomonosov Ridge. Proof that the Lomonosov Ridge extends from Greenland's continental shelf would give Denmark unfettered access to much of the seabed surrounding the North Pole. Currently, Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark and the Russian Federation assert that the Lomonosov Ridge are continuations of their own continental shelf, while the US claims it to be an oceanic ridge and thus not an extension of any State's continental shelf.

2013

Canada is expected to submit a claim to the CLCS, within UNCLOS, to prove the Lomonosov Ridge is a continuation of its own continental shelf.

Canada is expected to claim that the ridge is an underwater extension of Ellesmere Island. If it's proven that the Lomonosov Ridge is an extension of Canada's continental shelf, Canada would obtain unfettered access beyond their exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200nm, and instead, would gain access to the seabed and its resources across the continental shelf. Canada would be required to submit bathymetry, seismic and gravity data to substantiate its claim.

Current Laws and Treaties

UNCLOS

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), also called the Law of the Sea Convention or the Law of the Sea Treaty, is the international agreement that resulted from the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which took place between 1973 and 1982. The Law of the Sea Convention defines the rights and responsibilities of nations with respect to their use of the world's oceans, establishing guidelines for businesses, the environment, and the management of marine natural resources.

UNCLOS I

In 1956, the United Nations held its first Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) in Geneva, Switzerland. UNCLOS I resulted in four treaties concluded in 1958:

- Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, entry into force: 10 September 1964
- Convention on the Continental Shelf, entry into force: 10 June 1964
- Convention on the High Seas, entry into force: 30 September 1962

- Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas, entry into force: 20 March 1966

Although UNCLOS I was considered a success, it left open the important issue of breadth of territorial waters. This was followed by UNCLOS II and UNCLOS III. (5)

UNCLOS II

In 1960, the United Nations held the second Conference on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS II"); however, the six-week Geneva conference did not result in any new agreements. Generally speaking, developing nations and third world countries participated only as clients, allies, or dependents of the United States or the Soviet Union, with no significant voice of their own.

UNCLOS III

The convention set the limit of various areas, measured from a carefully defined baseline. (Normally, a sea baseline follows the low-water line, but when the coastline is deeply indented, has fringing islands or is highly unstable, straight baselines may be used.) The areas are as follows:

- Internal Waters
- Territorial Waters
- Archipelagic Waters
- Contiguous Zone
- Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs)
- Continental Shelf

Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS)

The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) (sometimes referred to as the Finnish Initiative) is a multilateral, non-binding agreement among Arctic states aimed at Arctic environment protection. Discussions began in 1989, with the AEPS adopted in June 1991 by Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the USSR, and the United States. The AEPS deals with monitoring, assessment, protection, emergency preparedness/response, and conservation of the Arctic zone. In January 1989, Finland sent a letter to the other Arctic states proposing a conference on protection of the Arctic environment. The Rovaniemi Meeting of September 1989 established two working groups. This was followed by the second consultative meeting in Yellowknife, Canada in April 1990 where a third ad hoc group was established to develop the strategy. It also resulted in the preparation of a draft document. Kiruna, Sweden was the site of the third meeting, held in January 1991, where one group worked on the drafting the AEPS while another dealt with specific environmental issues.

Arctic Council

The Arctic Council is a high-level intergovernmental forum that addresses issues faced by the Arctic governments and the indigenous people of the Arctic. It has eight member countries: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States.

Approved intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organisations (both global and regional) and non-governmental organisations can also obtain Observer Status. They include the Arctic Parliamentarians, International Union for Conservation of Nature, the International Red Cross Federation, the Nordic Council, the Northern Forum, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Environment Programme; and a handful of non-governmental organisations such as the Association of World Reindeer Herders, the University of the Arctic, and the World Wide Fund for Nature-Arctic Programme.

The Arctic Council convenes every six months somewhere in the Chair's country for a Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) meeting. SAOs are high-level representatives from the eight member nations. Sometimes they are ambassadors, but often they are senior foreign ministry officials entrusted with staff-level coordination. Representatives of the six Permanent Participants and the official Observers also are in attendance.

At the end of the two-year cycle, the Chair hosts a Ministerial-level meeting, which is the culmination of the Council's work for that period. Most of the eight member nations are represented by a Minister from their Foreign Affairs, Northern Affairs, or Environment Ministry.

A formal, though non-binding, "Declaration", named for the town in which the meeting is held, sums up the past accomplishments and the future work of the Council. These Declarations cover climate change, sustainable development, Arctic monitoring and assessment, persistent organic pollutants and other contaminants, and the work of the Council's five Working Groups. (6)

Ilulissat Declaration

The Ilulissat Declaration was announced on May 28, 2008, by the five coastal states of the Arctic Ocean (United States, Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark), meeting at the political level during the Arctic Ocean Conference in Ilulissat, Greenland to discuss the Arctic ocean, climate change, the protection of the marine environment, maritime safety, and division of emergency responsibilities if new shipping routes are opened.

One of the chief goals written into the declaration was blockage of any "new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean". An additional pledge for "the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims," was expected as the conference invitation originated in 2007 as a consequence of several jurisdictional disputes, including Hans Island and Arktika 2007.

Because the objective of the meeting was to discuss legal regimes and jurisdictional issues in the Arctic Ocean, only the five coastal states of that ocean were invited. The Arctic Council, being the only circumpolar Arctic international forum, which also includes the three Arctic states that do not border the Arctic Ocean (Sweden, Finland and Iceland) was deliberately not used as a forum. These three states are therefore not a party to the Ilulissat Declaration. Likewise, the Arctic indigenous peoples, who have a prominent position within the Arctic Council, were not involved in the Ilulissat negotiations. (7)

Other international actions to be considered

- 1) A/RES/60/47 by the DISEC
- 2) International Maritime Organisation
- 3) Bloc Positions

Questions the committee must consider:

- 1) How can the Arctic's contested sovereignty be protected knowing that it isn't a state?
- 2) Is making Arctic a Free Zone a possible solution?
- 3) Should the military activities be regulated in the Arctic?
- 4) Is the Antarctic Treaty a viable model for a similar action in the Arctic?
- 5) How can the A5 powers be regulated?
- 6) How can the Territorial Disputes be settled in Arctic?
- 7) How can the Resource Rush in the Arctic be controlled?
- 8) If the resources are extracted how shall they be distributed?

Conclusion

The committee must take into consideration the intensifying 'scramble' for the Arctic in a larger historical and disciplinary framework, in order to make a case for the Arctic's underestimated significance in current social and cultural models of the global and the "planetary." Focusing on circumpolarity as configured in early modern exploration, Enlightenment science, and twentieth-century indigenous and governmental institutions. We must debate the circumpolar Arctic's unique reorientation of a planetary vision, combined with its pressing humanitarian and environmental difficulties, should be incorporated in current postcolonial cultural and social theory debates on the global scale. (8)

Bibliography

- 1) The Militarisation of Arctic: Emerging Reality, Exaggeration and Distracting Reality, Adam MacDonald, <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol15/no3/eng/PDF/CMJ153Ep18.pdf>
- 2) SOVEREIGNTY IN THE ARCTIC: AN ANALYSIS OF TERRITORIAL DISPUTES & ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS, KATHRYN ISTEAD, http://archive.law.fsu.edu/journals/transnational/vol18_2/isted.pdf
- 3) A Brewing Cold War in The Warming Arctic, Shakthi P Srichandan, <http://www.newindianexpress.com/columns/A-Brewing-Cold-War-in-The-Warming-Arctic/2015/10/10/article3071409.ece>
- 4) Timeline, <http://www.stimson.org/infographics/evolution-of-arctic-territorial-claims-and-agreements-a-timeline-1903-present/>
- 5) http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf
- 6) <http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/>
- 7) http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Illulissat_Declaration.pdf

8) Scramble for Arctic, Adriana Carcuin

Extra Resources

- <http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2077&context=ilj>
- http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf
- http://www.unep.org/dewa/Portals/67/pdf/A_res_60_47.pdf
- <http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/>
- http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Illulissat_Declaration.pdf
- http://archive.law.fsu.edu/journals/transnational/vol18_2/isted.pdf
- <http://arcticcontroversy.weebly.com/unclos--clcs.html>
- <https://ehistory.osu.edu/exhibitions/arctic-sovereignty/index>
- <http://www.carbonbrief.org/avoiding-a-new-cold-war-the-us-militarys-new-arctic-strategy>
- <http://uk.businessinsider.com/chart-of-russias-militarization-of-arctic-2015-8?r=US&IR=T>
- <http://uk.businessinsider.com/russia-is-militarizing-the-arctic-2014-12?r=US&IR=T>
- <http://www.eurodialogue.eu/energy-security/The-Militarization-of-the-Arctic>
- <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13698010902752855>
- <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00045608.2010.500560?src=recsys>
- <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396330903309899?src=recsys>
- <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol15/no3/eng/PDF/CMJ153Ep18.pdf>



Topic B:

The growing relevance of UAVs in International Security, Armed Conflicts and Peacekeeping Missions

Introduction

Drones, also known as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) or Remotely Piloted Air Systems (RPASs) are not solely devices with solely military applications. Their development has resulted in questions being raised from the ethical nature of their use in warfare, to discussions about artificial intelligence (AI) and the extent to which AI can make military decisions. Drones come in a variety of different sizes and can be used for a many different ends.

They are most renowned, however, for their use in the US's ongoing War on Terror, in particular their use in attacking suspected terrorists in countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan and Yemen.

The main uses that concern the Security Council are the roles that drones can have specifically in warfare, such as reconnaissance and attacking targets with missiles and bombs. With technological developments it is possible for drones to be deployed over further distances as they become capable of flying for longer periods of time – in 2010 the UK developed a drone called Zephyr, capable of flying for over 82 hours. They can either be controlled from the ground or fly on pre-programmed routes.

History of the Problem

The use of UAVs has been gradually adapted and developed over time as outlined below:

Pre 1960s:

- The first form of attack drone was used from the beginning of World War I, where creators such as Professor Archibald Lowe wished to develop more sophisticated forms of aerial attack yet was limited technologically

1960s–1970s:

- Helicopter drones were launched from Destroyers by the American's at Soviet submarines during the Cold War
- Their main use however was in reconnaissance; as manned aircraft were still considered more reliable

- Use of UAVs recommenced in the 1970s so as to target Surface-to-air missile (SAMs) Sites
- The first nation to develop military drone technology was Israel in response to its heavy air force losses in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War

1990s:

- By the late 1990s the role of drones was adapted so to monitor hostile territories
- In tandem with this the U.S. Navy also started to develop unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs)

2000s:

- The US is now the largest producer and user of drone technology
- Armed drones have been used in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan – Reaper and Predator Drones from the US and UK were able to be externally directed from bases such as the Nellis and Creech USF Base in Nevada
- Other nations such as China and Israel also have active drone policies, and Germany stated in June 2013 that it planned to acquire drones, which it has now done
- More recently they have also been used in Somalia and DRC by the United Nations to monitor the situations in those nations

Discussion of the problem

After 9/11, drones became the weapon of choice in the war on terror. The most frequent use took place in countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, but more recently also in Somalia and Yemen. Their military prominence is a result of the technological advances which allow accurate intelligence of a region and enable to pinpoint targets over large distances. Therefore, advocates of their use stress the fact that drones make killings more precise and that less damage and casualties are caused. UCAVs are considered to be cost-effective and another advantage is that their use minimizes the risk of a pilot's life. In contrast, adversaries state that the use of drones is unlawful and too many civilians are being killed. Living under Drones, a report about their employment in Pakistan revealed that amongst the estimated 2500-3500 people killed by drones until 2012, up to 800 were civilians. It is also estimated that drone strikes cause a considerable psychological harm to both the commander and the civil population. Some analysts fear that the use of drones desensitizes targeted killings and dehumanizes conflict. Hence, one can speak of a growing moral and also legal concern about drones.

In international law, UCAVs are not explicitly prohibited. The unarmed drones can be very useful if an area is hit by a natural disaster and the working personnel needs information about the situation on the ground or for other civilian purposes. Their use might become unlawful, however, if civilians are killed by armed UCAVs. The United States, for example, use drones on territories without having declared war. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is carrying out these attacks, under international law; however, the CIA has a non-combatant status. Consequently, principles of international law governing war such as the Geneva Conventions are not always respected with the use of drones. One example could be that the Geneva Conventions states that civilians must be protected and collateral damage must be limited to a minimum/avoided. Drones violate this principle. Growing concern also rises about the accountability of drone strikes, as they become much more likely because they seem easier and less risky. As more and more countries acquire the technology, accountability of when drones are used where and why will become more and more difficult.

Most of the accounted drones are used by the US in attacks against rebels or terroristic groups mainly in the Middle East region and Africa. Many of the reports on drone use concern the US actions in Pakistan. Since 2014, the US uses drones in their War against Terror to kill suspected terrorists the CIA identified beforehand. These actions are secret and Barack Obama confirmed this practice only in 2012. Targets are members of al-Qaida, the Taliban etc. These attacks, however, are not always lawful and many civilians have been killed, among them more than 300 children.

In Yemen, the US also attacks al-Qaida suspects and training camps. Recently, a camp in the southern province of Abjan has been fully destroyed by such an American drone attack. Many civilians have also been killed during the Yemen attacks. One example dates back to 2013, where the CIA has accidentally bombed a family on their way to the wedding instead of terrorists. 16 people died in this tragedy.

Up to ten drone attacks have been undertaken in Somalia until now. An interesting fact is that the attacks are being planned and executed from German soil (US bases in Stuttgart and Ramstein), which causes accountability problems regarding drone attacks, and their limits within international law. A majority of the people that died from US drone use in Somalian airspace are from the Shabaab-militia, which aims to make their country an Islamic state.

Efforts taken to address the issue

During the last decade, there has been only little discussion on drone strikes in the UN. Security Council action is prevented by the United States' veto. Countries that are particularly hit by drone strikes such as Pakistan and Yemen have called upon the UN to take action several times. Pakistan for instance has become a leading international critic of drone warfare in its country and urges the international community to establish an internationally binding legal framework on drone use. The country claims that American war conduct in Pakistani air space is a violation of their sovereignty. Pakistan's ambassador even called the American attacks "totally counterproductive". UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, also condemned the use ofUCAVs during her opening statement for the 20th Human Rights Council. Special rapporteur on extra-judicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, stressed in a report in 2013 that the use of armed drones in countries is highly problematic if there is not a recognized armed conflict. This is to say that strikes outside a combat zone constitute a war crime. He added: "Armed drones may fall into the hands of non-state actors and may also be hacked by enemies or other entities. In sum, the number of states with the capacity to use drones is likely to increase significantly in the near future, underscoring the need for greater consensus on the terms of their use".

Without an international framework to govern the use of drone attacks, drone use creates a precedent for remote and unrestrained warfare.

The United Nations needs to formulate a resolution, which is legally binding to the major drone possessing countries. A first step has been taken in Human Rights Council in March 2014 passing the resolution A/HRC/25/L.32 "Ensuring use of remotely piloted aircraft or armed drones in counter-terrorism and military operations in accordance with international law, including international human rights and humanitarian law." Important players such as the United States or United Kingdom and France, however, objected this resolution. One of the main criticisms was that the Human Rights Council would not have enough expertise to tackle the issue of drones.

In Resolution A/RES/68/178 from December 2013, the General Assembly already stated that measures, including the use of drones, have to "comply with their obligations under

international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, human rights law and international humanitarian law, in particular the principles of distinction and proportionality”.

These are only first steps to tackle the use ofUCAVs in conflict zones. It is now up to you delegates of DISEC, to agree on a more detailed resolution on the topic of drone warfare.

Bloc positions

There is a wide range of countries pushing the further development of drones. Defining clear block positions on this matter is not as simple as it is when conflicts or similar questions are concerned.

While in public, the opinions on the use ofUCAVs cause lots of discussions and debates for ethical reasons, most governments and of course military commands embrace the idea of autonomous warfare since no men are put in harm’s way. Therefore, countries opinions differ from each other significantly. Generally speaking, though, countries with a great military power and focus are also supporting the idea of drone strikes. The PewResearchCenter put together an interesting statistic on citizens’ approval onUCAV usage, which can be found here: <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/10/23/report-questions-drone-use-widelyunpopular-globally-but-not-in-the-u-s/>.

Israel

A very important player in this topic is Israel since it is not only possessing and using UAVs in the latest Gaza conflict but also exporting more of them than any other country. Even though Israel never confirmed it specifically they are known to also have used armed drones in military confrontations. Nevertheless, they are one of the countries who led the way of use and development for the past years.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

A country acknowledging the use of armed drones is the United Kingdom, having used them in Afghanistan. So far there are however no clear figures upon what exact impact their deployment had in combat. The British Ministry of Defence stresses furthermore that armed British drones were only put to use in the war in Afghanistan and not for any kind of pre-emptive self-defence purpose in other countries.

United States of America

Then there is the third country, which is known to already have used armed UAVs - the United States of America. As it is well known they have putUCAVs to use in their wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In contrary to the United Kingdom, they also used them for attacks in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia for pre-emptive purposes, which has caused outcry in the countries concerned.

Pakistan

Pakistan, alongside other countries, is fighting for stronger control of UCAV usage. They already proposed and passed a resolution in the Human Rights Council which urges all states to make sure that measures involving UCAVs are comply with international law. Details on this resolution can be read here: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/HRC/25/L.32.

Overview on P5 positions

France appears to acquire drones from other countries but is also working on a huge project with other European countries and especially the United Kingdom to manufacture its own drones. China developed its own kinds of drones for both reconnaissance as well as combat purpose and also possesses a significant amount of them. Russia is still at the beginning of a drones arms race and is believed to have its first UCAV ready to go by 2020.

Since opinions and positions differ so drastically we strongly recommend researching this item very thoroughly.

Further Research

Start your preparation by researching facts about your own country, its position on UCAVs and try to find other countries that have a similar approach as yours. You will need them as allies to support the ideas when you will be drafting a working paper and later a resolution during the debate. It is also interesting to find out which other diverging positions exist in order to take them into account when preparing a resolution that needs the broadest consensus possible.

This study guide should serve as a first introduction to your research. Now you should go further and take into account previous DISEC resolutions and actions by other UN bodies as well as sites such as the CIA Fact book when you are conducting research about a specific country.

Here are some useful links as well:

- World Factbook - <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>
- Security Council Resolutions:
<http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/index.shtml>
- Groups such as the International Crisis Group can be a good source of information
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/Search%20Results.aspx?keywords=drones>.

Questions a Resolution should answer

These questions should help you prepare a position paper on the topic and you should find answers with regard to your country's position during your research in order to be able to answer them in a resolution. Of course, the list is not exhaustive but only states some of the

issues at hand. Through a motion for a moderated caucus during the debate, you will have the possibility to focus on a certain aspect of particular concern and to discuss it in detail if you wish to do this.

The main questions to tackle during the debate will be:

- What does the UN have to take into account with regard to the fact that drones are increasingly used in international conflicts?
- Are drones lawful? Do they comply with the obligation to take care of civilians?
- Should drone use be restricted by the international community?
- What could the UN do to restrict the use of UAVs? May they only be employed during UN mandated operations?
- What can be done to prevent accidental deaths of civilians?
- How can the country operating a drone strike be made legally responsible?
- How to cope with drone strikes outside of legally declared war zones?
- How can the use of drones be made more accountable and transparent?
- How can the peaceful uses of drone be protected while at the same time the unlawful use needs to be limited?

